knj. 5. Od Zenona do Bergsona : studije i članci iz istorija filozofije -- knj. 9. Prirodnjački spisi -- knj. 10. Naučni spisi -- knj. 11. Rezime filozofskih i naučnih radova -- knj. 12. Autobiografija, pesme, prepiska.

While many Western countries do legally permit homebirths under certain conditions, in the Slovak Republic they exist in a legal vacuum – they are neither permitted nor prohibited. In the present study, we aimed to explore how Slovak women who deliberately delivered at home perceive the reason for this decision and the subsequent homebirth itself. We interviewed eight women aged 21 to 36 and analysed the transcripts using the interpretative phenomenological analysis framework. The analysis revealed four major themes – (1) (...) the sacredness of childbirth, (2) the aspiration to be the director of your childbirth, (3) homebirth as an expression of the need for intimacy, and (4) the struggle with one’s social circle. Childbirth is seen as an ultimate act of nature defined by its beauty and purity, but these qualities are tainted by biomedical approach of healthcare providers. The results of this study suggest that women’s needs of autonomy, relatedness, and inclusion are not properly met by Slovak health care and obstetrics. Stricter adherence to the principle of informed consent during hospital births, and legalisation and regulation of homebirths could reduce medical risks during childbirth and improve women’s mental well-being during and after a pivotal moment in their life. (shrink)

My thesis focuses on the connection between conversation and virtue in Plato’s dialogues. It is often argued that conversation is an instrumental good - that it is conducted in order to obtain knowledge, and more precisely, knowledge of virtue. And once one obtains this knowledge, one can go about one’s life and act virtuously. I am proposing that conversation is a final good. My starting point is the analysis of the Apology, and by taking seriously Socrates’ claim at 38a that (...) ‘it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day’ I establish that conversation is something to be done for its own sake and I take this to mean that it is a place for interlocutors to display virtue. Moreover, I use the Apology to argue that Socrates has not always been aware of conversation being an end in itself. I then focus on three dialogues - the Laches, the Euthyphro and the Charmides to show us, both through their content and their drama, that virtues can and indeed should be exhibited in conversation. (shrink)

The logic of the weak law of excluded middleKC p is obtained by adding the formula A A as an axiom scheme to Heyting's intuitionistic logicH p . A cut-free sequent calculus for this logic is given. As the consequences of the cut-elimination theorem, we get the decidability of the propositional part of this calculus, its separability, equality of the negationless fragments ofKC p andH p , interpolation theorems and so on. From the proof-theoretical point of view, the formulation presented (...) in this paper makes clearer the relations betweenKC p ,H p , and the classical logic. In the end, an interpretation of classical propositional logic in the propositional part ofKC p is given. (shrink)

The article deals with the breakdown of the co called „grand narratives“ and with processes that preceded it. The author focuses on the degradation of the traditional meaningful forms, such as myth and grand narrative, and their becoming a „story“. He offers a detailed examination of the essential characteristics of a story. He sees the particular forms of the codification of the world as related to following developments: the rise of grand narratives as related to the transition to linear alphabetical (...) codes, while their transformation into a story as connected with the rise of technological images. He sees this transition as a negative phenomenon, since this shift of the focus of human activities on images resulted in a significant reduction of our freedom. (shrink)

We prove that every finitely axiomatizable extension of Heyting's intuitionistic logic has a corresponding cut-free Gentzen-type formulation. It is shown how one can use this result to find the corresponding normalizable natural deduction system and to give a criterion for separability of considered logic. Obviously, the question how to obtain an effective definition of a sequent calculus which corresponds to a concrete logic remains a separate problem for every logic.

In distinction from the well-known double-negation embeddings of the classical logic we consider some variants of single-negation embeddings and describe some classes of superintuitionistic first-order predicate logics in which the classical first-order calculus is interpretable in such a way. Also we find the minimal extensions of Heyting's logic in which the classical predicate logic can be embedded by means of these translations.

Deliberative democracy, as a dominant paradigm in contemporary democratic theory, offers a new, attractive conception of democratic legitimacy, which represents an alternative to a democracy that functions through the mechanism of political competition. A major problem with deliberation is the issue of its institutionalisation, as the theories of deliberative democracy have not produced a more specific institutional framework or form in which it could be used in political practice. Parliaments appear to be particularly suitable places for its potential implementation. Moreover, (...) deliberative democracy could contribute to a change in discourse quality and the way decision-making is conducted in parliaments, which is often considered problematic. Due to its incompatibility with competitive democracy, the opportunities for introducing deliberative democracy into parliaments are very limited. The study also outlines three ways of reconciling deliberative democracy and parliaments. (shrink)

A normalizable natural deduction formulation, with subformula property, of the implicative fragment of classical logic is presented. A traditional notion of normal deduction is adapted and the corresponding weak normalization theorem is proved. An embedding of the classical logic into the intuitionistic logic, restricted on propositional implicational language, is described as well. We believe that this multiple-conclusion approach places the classical logic in the same plane with the intuitionistic logic, from the proof-theoretical viewpoint.

The language of the propositional calculus is extended by two families of propositional probability operators, inductively applicable to the formulae, and the set of all formulae provable in an arbitrary superintuitionistic propositional logic is extended by the probability measure axioms concerning those probability operators. A logical system obtained in such a way, similar to a kind of polymodal logic, makes possible to express a probability measure of truthfulness of any formula. The paper contains a description of the Kripke-type possible worlds (...) semantics covering the considered logical systems, being followed by the corresponding completeness results. (shrink)

The propositional language extended by two families of unary propositional probability operators and the corresponding list of probability measure axioms concerning those operators is the basis of the system preseted here. We describe a Kripke-type possible worlds semantics covering such a kind of logical systems.1.

In adaptive development, mental well-being has a role to play in adolescents’ search in adolescents’ niche in life and the formation of a separate identity. Although this has been an area of interest in a number of disciplines, there remains ambiguity over our understanding of terms such as quality of life, life satisfaction, and mental well-being. Our aim was to employ an interpretative phenomenological analysis to find out how adolescent boys perceive the concept of mental well-being and ascertain what helps (...) them and stops them from “feeling chilled”. The data was obtained from a sample of 26 secondary school students who attended one of four focus groups. We found that they achieved a kind of escape from the world of social roles through performing activities like physical exercise or driving a vehicle, while searching for a sense of latitude and potency and attempting to reduce tension. Thus there is a clear distinction between what they desire and what is expected of them. Hanging out and “chilling” with their peer group seemed to be an important part of relationship formation, while close dyadic relationships were less significant. To a certain degree, the results of this study contradict conventional notions of happiness and mental well-being found in mainstream psychology. (shrink)

An analysis is provided for one possible practical link between rhetorical and social scientific inquiry. That link is found in the rhetoric of the reasoned social scientific fact. Understanding this point of intersection involves grounding a rhetorical theory of how to create and to evaluate arguments (a rhetorical theory of invention and judgment) in the practical problems that confront contemporary social scientists during their efforts to construct reasoned social facts. The applicability of this invention and judgment framework to analysis of (...) the rhetoric of social science is illustrated with reference to a controversy over the legitimacy of rules theoretic explanations of human communication processes. Implications of the practical link between rhetorical and social scientific inquiry are then drawn out. (shrink)

In Ilić and Boričić, the right-handed cut-free sequent calculus $GRW$ for the contraction-less relevant logic $RW$ is defined. In this paper, we show that the enlargement of the system $GRW$ with the structural rule of intensional contraction presents the sequent system for the principal relevant logic $R$ but the rule of cut cannot be eliminated in $GRW+$.

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

The Greek philosopher Aristotle, writing over two thousand years before Wall Street, called people who engaged in activities which did not contribute to society "parasites." In his latest work, renowned scholar Robert C. Solomon asserts that though capitalism may require capital, but it does not require, much less should it be defined by the parasites it inevitably attracts. Capitalism has succeeded not with brute strength or because it has made people rich, but because it has produced responsible citizens and--however unevenly--prosperous (...) communities. It cannot tolerate a conception of business that focuses solely on income and vulgarity while ignoring traditional virtues of responsibility, community, and integrity. Many feel that there is too much lip-service and not enough understanding of the importance of cooperation and integrity in corporate life. This book rejects the myths and metaphors of war-like competition that cloud business thinking and develops an "Aristotelean" theory of business. The author's approach emphasizes several core concepts: the corporation as community, the search for excellence, the importance of integrity and sound judgment, as well as a more cooperative and humane vision of business. Solomon stresses the virtues of honesty, trust, fairness, and compassion in the competitive business world, and confronts the problem of "moral mazes" and what he posits as its solution--moral courage. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)